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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 












        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-08-cr-00170-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
                   
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 27, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and ROTH, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: March 29, 2012) 
___________ 
 




 David Dupree appeals the District Court’s August 9, 2010, judgment of conviction 
and sentence.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment and sentence the 





 The morning of April 15, 2004, Latricia Samuels entered the M&T Bank in 
Lebanon, Pennsylvania, and asked for mortgage information.  After observing the 
number of people inside the bank, Latricia left to communicate that information to her 
brother, Ronald Samuels.  Shortly thereafter, Ronald and David Dupree, both armed and 
disguised, entered the bank.  One man, who was wearing a yellow parka, jumped over the 
counter, pointed a gun at the bank employees, and demanded money.  As he jumped back 
over the counter, his sunglasses fell from his head.  Meanwhile, the other man pointed his 
gun at various individuals inside the bank.  The two men fled to a car in the alley behind 
the bank, in which Latricia and Mayra Rodriguez, Ronald’s girlfriend, were waiting.  
Rodriguez drove them away, and the four individuals later divided the approximately 
$10,418 stolen from the bank.   
 DNA testing performed on material recovered from the sunglasses subsequently 
revealed a positive match to Ronald.  On April 23, 2008, Dupree and his co-defendants 
were indicted for armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (Count I, against 
all four defendants), use of a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c) (Count II, against Ronald and Dupree), and conspiracy to commit armed bank 
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count III, against all four defendants).  Ronald, 
Latricia, and Rodriguez pled guilty.  Dupree was arrested on December 18, 2008, and he 
entered a plea of not guilty on February 10, 2009.    
 On November 2, 2009, Dupree proceeded to a jury trial.  Latricia and Rodriguez 
testified against Dupree; Ronald was not called as a witness.  To rehabilitate the 
credibility of Rodriguez and Latricia after impeachment, the prosecution called FBI 
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Special Agent Robert Daniel Craft as a witness.  Special Agent Craft testified that he 
interviewed all three accomplices and that the information they provided was ultimately 
consistent.  After cross and re-cross examination regarding other individuals and bank 
robberies and upon further re-direct examination, Special Agent Craft testified: 
Q:  Did Ronald Samuels ever indicate relative to the M&T Bank that it was 
anyone other than David Dupree that robbed that bank? 
A:  He never did.  He was consistent from day one who was with him. 
Q:  And is that reflected in that 302? 
A:  Yes.  Samuels confessed to robbing the M&T Bank in Lebanon, Pennsylvania, 
on April 15th, 2004.  Samuels was with David Dupree, Mayra Rodriguez and 
Latricia Samuels.  
  
On November 4, 2009, the jury found Dupree guilty of all three counts.  On May 18, 
2010, the District Court denied Dupree’s post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal.   
 On August 6, 2010, Dupree was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 332 
months.  The District Court determined that Dupree was a Career Offender based on 
three controlled substance convictions for offenses separated by intervening arrests but 
for which he was sentenced on the same date.  The District Court granted a 28-month 
variance based on the 188-month sentence received by Ronald.   
Dupree appealed.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 




A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
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 For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we “view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government and must sustain a jury’s verdict if a reasonable jury 
believing the government’s evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
government proved all the elements of the offenses.”  United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 
160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).  This places “a very heavy burden” 
on appellant.  Id.   
1. Insured by the FDIC 
 Dupree was convicted of bank robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2113, which 
provides that “as used in this section the term ‘bank’ means . . . any bank the deposits of 
which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.”  18 U.S.C. § 2113(f).  
Dupree argues the Indictment should be dismissed because the prosecution failed to 
prove that the bank is insured by the FDIC. 
 During the trial, however, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the branch 
manager of M&T Bank: 
Q:  Ms. Mitchell, is your bank insured? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Who is it insured by? 
A:  FDIC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
 
Based on that testimony, the jury could reasonably find that the bank was insured by the 
FDIC when the crime occurred.  See United States v. Harper, 314 F. App’x 478, 482 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (explaining that rational jury could find employees’ testimony that bank was 
presently FDIC insured sufficient to find banks were also insured at the time of the 
robberies).               
5 
 
2. Accomplice Testimony 
Dupree acknowledges that accomplice testimony is “valid” evidence but argues 
that the testimony of Rodriguez and Latricia was “so inconsistent, confusing, and 
contradictory” that it could not serve as the sole evidence supporting his conviction.  
However, as Dupree concedes, “uncorroborated accomplice testimony may 
constitutionally provide the exclusive basis for a criminal conviction.”  United States v. 
DeLarosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1061-62 (3d Cir. 1971).   
Although there were inconsistencies, Rodriguez and Latricia testified consistently 
on critical aspects of the case, including that:  Dupree agreed to rob the bank with Ronald 
and them, Dupree and Ronald ran to the getaway car, Dupree was wearing a black jacket, 
and all four drove away from the robbery and later split the proceeds.  In addition, the 
District Court instructed the jury about credibility, inconsistent statements, and 
accomplice testimony.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, we find that a reasonable jury could base its verdict on the accomplice 
testimony of Rodriguez and Latricia.   
B. Statement of Non-Testifying Accomplice 
 Dupree contends that a Bruton violation occurred when the prosecution introduced 
a hearsay statement of a non-testifying accomplice that implicated him, i.e., when Special 
Agent Craft testified that Ronald confessed to robbing the bank with Dupree.  Because 
Dupree did not raise the error at trial, we review for plain error.  Under that standard, the 
Court may, in its discretion, correct an error only if the appellant demonstrates that:  1) 
there is an error, 2) the error is “clear or obvious,” 3) the error “affected the appellant’s 
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substantial rights,” i.e., affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings, and 4) the 
error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010).   
 Dupree’s argument is inapt because Bruton only applies to cases involving joint 
trials.  See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 123-24 (1968); United States v. 
Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Pinto, 413 F.2d 727, 729 (3d 
Cir. 1969) (“The heart of Bruton is that if at a joint trial a co-defendant’s confession 
which involves another co-defendant is to be allowed into evidence the latter co-
defendant must be allowed his constitutional right of cross-examination secured by the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause if he so desires.”).    
 As the government admits, however, the issue raised implicates the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, which forbids the introduction of testimonial 
hearsay into evidence at trial unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 
(2004).  In light of the accomplice testimony that was consistent on critical aspects of the 
case, we conclude that Special Agent Craft’s brief and unsolicited testimony regarding 
Ronald’s statement did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.  The District Court did not, therefore, commit plain error.   
  
 
C.  Sentencing 
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 Dupree argues that the District Court erred in determining that he was a career 
offender without considering whether his prior convictions should be “functionally 
consolidated” under Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001).  We review the District 
Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.  United States v. Grier, 585 
F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review the sentence for significant procedural error 
and substantive reasonableness.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567-68 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc).     
     The parties disagree as to which version of the Guidelines applies, but because we 
reach the same conclusion regardless of which version is used, we will assume, 
arguendo, that Dupree is correct in this regard.  Before the 2007 Amendment, “prior 
sentences imposed in related cases are to be treated as one sentence.”  U.S.S.G.                
§ 4A1.2(a)(2).  Application Note 3 explains that: 
Prior sentences are not considered related if they were for offenses that were 
separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first 
offense prior to committing the second offense).  Otherwise, prior sentences are 
considered related if they resulted from offenses that . . . were consolidated for 
trial or sentencing. 
 
Under Buford, convictions are “functionally consolidated” if they were “factually or 
logically related, and sentencing was joint.”  Buford, 532 U.S. at 61.   
Dupree argues that his three prior drug offenses are “related” because they were 
“functionally consolidated” for sentencing.  Although Dupree was sentenced for the 
offenses on the same day, the offenses were separated by intervening arrests and thus 
they are not considered “related.”  The District Court did not err, therefore, in 
determining that Dupree was a career offender.  See United States v. Alexander, 385 F. 
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App’x 77, 78 (3d Cir. 2010) (analyzing pre-2007 Guidelines and finding no error in 
district court’s decision not to treat three prior offenses as “related” because they were 
separated by intervening arrests).     
 Having concluded that the sentence the District Court imposed is procedurally 
sound, we will affirm it “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the 
same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  Dupree does not contest the substantive reasonableness of his 
sentence, and we conclude that the sentence the District Court imposed was within its 
discretion.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence 
entered by the District Court.   
Conclusion 
